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Introduction

There is wide consensus on the need to regulate Greenhouse gases emissions (GHG) to limit the
adverse impact of climate change. Hardly any country in the world disputes that the current pattern
of GHG emissions is unsustainable. However, there is wide disagreement on the magnitude of the
optimal emission reductions, on the distribution of effort across countries, and on the timing of the
emission reductions. This is hardly a surprise: the climate problem is a perfect example of intragenerational and inter-generational externality. Emission abatement costs are local, while the
benefits of controlling the increase of GHG concentrations are global and will be experienced only far
in the future.
Current carbon taxes and permit trading programs cover only around 12 percent of global emissions
(Parry 2014) and current policies are still far from being effective and optimal (see, for instance,
Máca et al. 2012; Somanathan et al. 2014). It is unclear if future negotiations will be able to change
this dismal state of climate policy. The chances are that if any agreement can be reached, it will entail
a low level of commitment (Barret and Stavins 2003).
Some authors suggest that one way to kick-start climate policy is to think locally instead of globally.1
They notice that climate mitigation policy may have immediate and local co-benefits that could
partially or totally offset the cost of reducing GHG emissions. The question then becomes: “what
scale of CO2 pricing is in countries’ own interest” (Parry et al. 2014).
For example, investment in low-emission technologies may spur innovation and growth in markets
with unemployment and knowledge externalities (Bauer et al. 2009; Acemoglu et al. 2012; OECD
2012a). Carbon taxes or revenues from auctioning emission allowances may reduce distortions in the
tax system if appropriately managed (Pearce 1991; Goulder 1995; Carraro et al. 1996; Bovenberg
1999).
As a large fraction of GHG emissions comes from the combustion of fossil fuels, the use of oil, natural
gas and coal must be substantially reduced to meet any long-term climate mitigation goal. Fossil
fuels also cause local and present environmental damage because, if burnt, they release pollutants
that negatively affect human health, ecosystems and other assets. Climate mitigation policies would
thus reduce the burden of ground-level air pollution. The reduction of fossil fuels consumption and
the shift of the energy mix away from coal – the most polluting among the fossil fuels – to natural gas
is expected to reduce the concentrations of particulate matters, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
ozone precursors (NOX and VOC) and other toxic pollutants. Climate change mitigation can thus
generate immediate ancillary benefits2 by reducing the negative impacts of pollution on human
health, crop yields, building materials or ecosystems.
The aim of this paper is to provide estimates of local air quality ancillary benefits of carbon taxes in
Europe. We assume that the carbon price is exogenously set to achieve the most recent set of

1

For a survey see Chapter 15 of the Fifth Assessment Report of Working Group III to the IPCC (Somanathan et
al. 2014).
2
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Third Assessment Report) distinguishes between ancillary
benefits and co-benefits (IPCC 2001). Ancillary benefits are related to policies or measures that are targeted
entirely on climate change mitigation, while co-benefits are referred to when policies or measures are designed
for more than one target (Dudek et al. 2003). We consider aggregated ancillary benefits in this report.
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climate mitigation targets used in the literature3 and we estimate the air-quality benefits of such
climate policies. We argue that these benefits should be kept logically distinct from the benefits of
climate mitigation. Our goal is to estimate the size of local air quality externalities compared to the
global carbon price. We also estimate the value of ancillary benefits per ton of GHG emission abated
and per Euro of abatement costs in the power sector in Europe.
In order to assess the local environmental benefits of climate policy we use the integrated
assessment model WITCH to provide fossil fuel use in the power sector under alternative carbon tax
scenarios and an impact pathway analysis embedded in the ExternE method (EC 2005) to estimate
the economic damage of emissions of particulate matters or various fractions (PM10, PM2.5),
sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOX), non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs),
and heavy metals (As, Cd, Cr, Hg, Ni, Pb). Although our economic model is global, we consider the
ancillary benefits for Europe and the abatement costs involved for the electricity sector in Europe.
Despite recent efforts to increase the level of renewable electricity generation, coal fired power
plants still provide about 25% of total electricity generation in Europe. Coal is the fossil fuel that
causes the largest local and global environmental damage. Any effort to reduce GHGs emissions will
also yield large local environmental benefits in Europe.
Overall the strengths of our approach are: (1) cost effective energy and emissions scenarios that
deliver the most recent climate mitigation targets; (2) the use of atmospheric circulation models to
track the impact of air pollution using; (3) the ability to estimate EU-wide and country-level ancillary
benefits; (4) the inclusion of Eastern European countries, typically not considered by European
studies; (5) the possibility to separate the ancillary benefits between those caused by reduction in
local energy use and those due to emissions reductions elsewhere.
In the RCP2.6 mitigation scenario – a +2°C compatible scenario – we find that discounted total
ancillary benefits for Europe are greater than €2.5T, or about €21.6 per abated ton of CO2. Less strict
climate policy scenarios generate overall smaller local benefits, but the magnitude of ancillary
benefits per abated ton of CO2 is still considerable (€14.4, or €18.3, respectively) than under stricter
mitigation. Without discounting, the ancillary benefits are in a range of €36 to €50 per ton of CO2
abated. Over the whole century ancillary benefits per abated ton of CO2 are 7-times larger than the
carbon price in the less aggressive climate scenario and only 0.06 of the carbon price that has quite
large value in the RCP2.6 mitigation scenario. Ancillary benefits cumulated over the century exceed
cumulative additional cost of electricity generation in Europe in both strict mitigation scenarios.
About 73% of total ancillary benefits attributable to the RCP4.5 mitigation scenario have domestic
origin, while the rest of benefits is enjoyed in other countries than in a country where the emissions
are abated. There are relative losers and winners with respect to produced and received ancillary
benefits. However, there is no country in Europe that will be worse-off if the mitigation policy was
implemented. Scenarios with technological constraints do not lead to qualitatively different results.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the ancillary
benefits, while Section 3 describes the integrated assessment model, the impact pathway analysis,
and the linkages between the two approaches. Section 4 describes climate policy scenarios and
energy use in Europe. Section 5 presents estimates of the side benefits of climate policy. Conclusions
follow.

3

We conduct cost-effectiveness analysis in our study rather than cost-benefit analysis in order to provide
information on the efficient level of regulation and hence the optimal level of carbon tax.
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2

Literature Review

The ancillary benefits of GHG mitigation policies have been investigated in a variety of empirical
studies. The literature has used a wide range of techniques and models, it has covered different
geographic areas, pollutants and pollution-related impacts. Some studies rely on air quality modelling
while others use default damage factors per pollutant.4 Due to these differences, results from these
studies are difficult to compare.
Among the studies that analyze the effect of a policy on multiple pollutants, a first distinction can be
made between studies that focus on physical impacts (e.g. Meyer et al. 1998) and studies that
emphasize the monetization of the impacts (e.g. Burtraw et al. 2003). Several studies investigated
the links between regional air pollution and climate policy in Europe (Syri et al. 2001; Alcamo et al.
2002; van Harmelen et al. 2002). Most, if not all, studies on ancillary benefits either utilize a damage
factor for each pollutant or connect emissions to changes in concentrations, human exposures,
physical effects and monetary damages using an integrated assessment model, such as the US APEEP
(Muller and Mendelsohn 2007) or the EU ExternE’s impact pathway analysis (Holland et al. 2011).
Regarding the economic modelling, the ancillary benefits are quantified (a) relying on a linear
programming partial equilibrium energy model (e.g., Burtraw et al. 2003; Van Vuuren et al. 2006;
Riekkola et al. 2011; Holland et al. 2011; Rečka and Ščasný 2013) that can be further enriched, for
instance, by econometric estimates of abatement costs (Burtraw et al. 2014), or (b) using a
computable general equilibrium model (e.g., Glomsrød et al. 1992; Scheraga and Leary 1993; Paltsev
et al. 2005; Grossman et al. 2011; Nam et al. 2013; Kiuila et al. forthcoming). Bollen et al. (2009) use
the MERGE model, a top-down optimization model with a good energy sector detail. MERGE is the
model used in the ancillary benefits literature that is most similar to WITCH. There are however
several differences between our study and Bollen at al. (2009). First, we are concerned with the
estimation of ancillary benefits rather than the joint optimal determination of local pollution
abatement and global GHG emissions reduction. Second we consider the most recent scenarios in
the climate change literature and we provide information on ancillary benefits associated to each
scenario. Third, while Bollen et al. (2009) only consider PM pollution, we include a much larger set of
pollutants in our analysis. Fourth, we do not have a hard-linked air pollution impact module, which is
a weakness, but the flexibility of a soft-link approach allows us to use a more complicated modelling
approach that takes into account the atmospheric circulation of local pollutants. Finally, Bollen et al.
(2009) deal with global costs and benefits while we provide EU-level and country-level analysis.
The range of estimates of air-quality ancillary benefits is large and depends on many factors,
including climate policy scenario, modelling assumptions and the time period over which the benefits
are calculated. In their review of the literature Davis et al. (2000) report a range from €0.6 to €78
(Dessus and O’Connor 1999) and €148 (Aunan et al. 2000) per ton of reduced CO2 emissions.5 A
review of 48 peer reviewed studies by Nemet et al. (2010) provides a range of the air quality cobenefits of climate change mitigation from €1.6 to €152 per ton of abated CO2 with a mean of
€38/tCO2. Focusing on the co-benefits from mitigation in the US electricity sector, Nemet et al.
provide a range of estimates ranging from €3 to €90, and found larger ancillary benefit estimates for

4

See, for instance, Bell et al. (2008) that discusses the methodological aspects in quantification of ancillary
benefits.
5
Davis et al. (2000) and then OECD (2002) report the ancillary benefits per ton of carbon in 1996 US$. We use
OECD CPI and purchasing power parity and express the benefits in 2005 Euro per ton of CO2. Following same
approach, we recalculated the 2008 USD from Nemet et al. (2010) and the 2010 USD from Parry et al. (2014) in
2005 Euro.
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developing countries (with a mean of €62) than for the developed countries (mean €33). Parry et al.
(2014) derive ‘nationally efficient carbon prices’ that reflect domestic non-internalized
environmental benefits for top 20 emitters of GHG emissions. The efficient prices reflect primarily
health co-benefits from reduced air pollution at coal plants and reductions in automobile
externalities, which are net of fuel taxes or subsidies. They find that the cross-country average of
nationally efficient prices is equal to €44 per ton of CO2 in 2010 (with a range between €22 to €66 per
ton as the damage values are reduced and increased by 50 percent). These prices substantially vary,
however, across countries; the nationally efficient CO2 price is as high as €224 per ton in Saudi
Arabia, €48 per ton in China, or €28 in the United States. Brazil on average overcorrects for cobenefits through pre-existing policies that results in the negative efficient price of -€18. Coal air
pollution damage is estimated for the top twenty emitters at €66 per ton. It is important to note that
Parry et al. (2014) do not consider any benefit from reduced global warming when they calculate the
‘nationally efficient carbon price’. They calculate the value of the ancillary benefit of a carbon tax and
find the level at which the tax is equal to the local benefits.
For the EU, Holland et al. (2011) estimate that the 2˚C stabilization scenario would reduce SO2
emissions by 60%, NOx emissions by 46% and particulate matters by 19% using the partial
equilibrium energy model GAINS. These emission reductions would lead to large health
improvements and important co-benefits in ecosystems. The air quality co-benefits are estimated at
€43B per year by 2050 in the EU27, which corresponds to about €24 per ton of CO2. Markandya et al.
(2009) obtained similar results for the EU, but much greater co-benefits in fast growing countries
such as China and India. Barker and Rosendhal (2000) estimate the co-benefits from SO2, NOx and
PM10 reduction as an effect of carbon tax for Western Europe at €41 per ton of CO2 abated.
While the literature on ancillary benefits has considerably grown during the past twenty years,
studies aiming at developing countries or transforming economies in Eastern Europe are relatively
few (Morgenstern 2000). Aaheim et al. (1997) and Aunan et al. (2000) investigated the ancillary
benefits of several policies, covering energy efficiency or public transport, in Hungary. They
estimated annual health benefits in a range of $370 to $1,168m. Dudek et al. (2003) provide an
analysis of ancillary benefits of energy market reforms and emission trading for Russia and observe
30,000 to 40,000 lives saved that are then monetized using the Value of Statistical Life (VSL). Using a
linear optimization energy model linked to ExternE’s impact pathway analysis, Rečka and Ščasný
(2013) estimated the ancillary benefits of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) in the Czech
power sector at €3,100B during 2006-2030, or €4,100B if no new nuclear plant is allowed. These
results imply the ancillary benefits of €15 per ton of CO2 in both scenarios. Using same approach,
Ščasný and Rečka (forthcoming) obtained the ancillary benefits for tightening CO2 target in Slovakia
at €11 per ton of CO2. Kiuilia et al. (forthcoming) estimated co-benefits of full internalization of
external costs attributable to local pollutants in the Czech Republic by CGE model in a range of €32 to
€72, depending on the scenario and taxed sectors. The ancillary benefit estimates are summarized in
Table A - 2 in the Appendix.

3

Modelling framework

3.1 The WITCH model
WITCH (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid) is an Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) designed
to study the socioeconomic impacts of climate change and the implications of mitigation policies on
the energy sector, the economy and climate. WITCH is a global model where countries of the world
are grouped into thirteen regions: USA (United States of America), WEURO (Western EU and EFTA
countries), EEURO (Eastern EU countries), KOSAU (South Korea, South Africa and Australia), CAJAZ
5
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(Canada, Japan and New Zealand), TE (Transition Economies, namely Russia and Former Soviet Union
states and non-EU Eastern European countries), MENA (Middle East and North Africa), SSA (SubSaharan Africa except South Africa), SASIA (South Asian countries except India), EASIA (South-East
Asian countries), CHINA (People’s Democratic Republic of China and Taiwan), LACA (Latin America
and Central America) and INDIA (India).6 These regions strategically interact following the rules of an
open-loop Nash game: each region maximizes its own welfare given the behaviour of all other
regions. A cooperative solution, where one global social planner jointly maximizes a social welfare
function can also be implemented but was not used to generate the scenarios used in this study.
The model is defined as hybrid because it features an aggregated top-down Ramsey-type optimal
growth model combined with a detailed description of the energy sector. The aggregated economic
model is structured according to a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) framework where the two
macro-inputs, capital and labour, are combined with energy to produce the final output. The energy
node is then disaggregated in a detailed, fully integrated, bottom-up section that features all major
power technologies and non-electric energy demand aggregated by fuel. The model is able to study
the evolution of the energy sector in relationship with major economic and climate variables.
Technical change is endogenous in WITCH and is modelled via Learning-by-Researching (LbR) and
Learning-by-Doing (LbD) effects. LbR determines technology cost reduction by means of dedicated
investments in R&D capital. International R&D spillovers are also taken into account. LbD reduces the
investment cost of renewable and backstop energy technologies as a consequence of progressive
deployment of the technology. A more detailed description of the model can be found in Bosetti et
al. (2006 2007 and 2009).

3.2 The ExternE method
We estimate the impact of climate change mitigation on air quality using a method based on the
most recent ExternE (Externalities of Energy)7 Impact Pathway Analysis (IPA).8 The IPA is an analytical
procedure examining the sequence of processes through which polluting emissions result into
external damages. The method allows to estimate the marginal physical impact and the marginal cost
of pollution from each power plant (in general from any emission source), as a function of the
technology and of the location of the plant.
The IPA comprises four basic steps: (i) selection of the reference power plant, determination of the
technology used and of the harmful emissions released, (ii) calculation of changes in pollutant
concentration for all affected regions using atmospheric dispersion models, (iii) estimation of

6

For the purposes of this work, the European Union is given by the sum of WEURO (Western Europe) and
EEURO (Eastern Europe), although this is not rigorously correct due to the presence of the EFTA countries in
the EU.
7
The European Commission in collaboration with the US Department of Energy launched a joint research
projects to assess the energy-related externalities in 1991 (European Commission 1995; ORNL and RFF 1995).
Following a detailed bottom-up methodology relying on impact pathway approach, the EU/US studies provided
estimates of marginal external costs of electricity production from a wide range of energy technologies at
various locations. The EC provided additional funding over the years to improve the ExternE accounting
framework and to expand it to new EU member states and to other non-EU countries. The ExternE IPA
framework that we use has been recently updated within the NEEDS project (http://www.needs-project.org/).
For more information on ExternE see http://www.externe.info. Weinzettell et al. (2012) apply the ExternE
method to quantify production and consumption related externalities of power sector in Europe.
8
An internet accessible version of EcoSense (EcoSenseWeb1.3) was developed within the NEEDS project (Preiss
and Klotz 2008).
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physical impacts from exposure using concentration-response functions (CFRs), and (iv) economic
valuation of impacts using direct costs (effect on crop yield, damage on building materials or
biodiversity) or compensating/equivalent surplus measured through the willingness-to-pay approach.
The ExternE’s IPA method is very similar to an integrated assessment model used in the American
studies to connect emissions to changes in concentrations, human exposures, physical effects and
monetary damages by the Air Pollution Emission Experiments and Policy model (APEEP, see Muller
and Mendelsohn 2007, 2009; Muller et al. 2011; Grossman et al. 2011).
The IPA procedure has been incorporated into EcoSense, the integrated atmospheric dispersion and
exposure assessment model that we use for our analysis.9 EcoSense uses air transport models to
control changes in the atmospheric concentration of pollutants at local, regional and global level.10
The model then determines a range of impacts on human health, buildings, biodiversity, and crop
yields using concentration-response functions. We evaluate the economic impact of micro-pollutants
using generic estimates of marginal costs – i.e. the same damage value regardless which country
releases the micro-pollutant – as estimated in the ExternE project series. The loss of ecosystems is
assessed using a measure of Potential Disappeared Fraction of species (Frischnecht and Steiner 2006)
linked to acidification and eutrophication. We use appropriate concentration-response functions to
estimate the economic loss from mortality and morbidity, from agricultural productivity losses and
for damages to building materials. Valuation methods of welfare economics are used to translate the
physical impacts into monetary impacts.
Impacts on human health, mainly on mortality, are the most important among all impacts. In order to
establish a causal relationship between pollution and human morbidity and mortality, ExternE uses
concentration-response functions calibrated using a large number of epidemiological and
toxicological studies. At the beginning of the ExternE project the CRFs of all European countries were
calibrated using studies for the United States. The European functions have now been re-calibrated
using epidemiological and toxicological studies for Europe. The economic loss due to increased
mortality is estimated using the Value of Life Year (VOLY) (Desaigues’ et al. 2011), reflecting recent
changes in the ExternE methodology. Previously, ExternE used a uniform Value of Statistical Life (VSL)
to value excess mortality. Several studies have argued that the VSL is appropriate to value large
losses of life expectancy from fatal accidents but it should not be used to estimate the usually smaller
impact of pollution on life expectancy, especially of elderlies (Rabl et al. 2014). Regardless which one
of the two metrics is used, they should be both based on the willingness to pay for a small reduction
in risk of dying (Hammitt 2007).
In this study, following the ExternE method, the VOLY for chronic mortality is set at €40,000, the
recommended value of ExternE for cost–benefit analyses of EU-level policies.11

9

http://ecosenseweb.ier.uni-stuttgart.de/
EcoSense uses three models of air quality: (i) the Industrial Source Complex Model for transport of primary
air pollutants on a local scale delaminated by 100 x 100 km around the power plant, (ii) the EMEP/MSC-West
Eulerian dispersion model for modelling transport and chemical transformation of primary pollutants on a
regional scale covering all Europe, and (iii) the N-Hemispheric Model which served for estimation of the
intercontinental influence primary and secondary pollutants (secondary inorganic aerosols, tropospheric
ozone).
11
The recommended value of so called chronic VOLY is based on the mean estimate of the willingness to pay
for changing life expectancy by two months using data from a pooled sample of nine European countries. Data
is adjusted using a simple benefit transfer technique to correct for the differences in income and population in
EU Member States. Monetary values for work loss day, medical costs, or the willingness to pay to avoid
illnesses also reflect EU-wide averages.
10
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The valuation of morbidity is by no means trivial. Morbidity increases medical costs and causes a loss
of productivity, but it also causes large, harder to measure, disutility from pain and suffering. There
has been recent interest in assessing the value of utility losses from illness, but more research is
needed, especially to value the damages from chronic illness (e.g. chronic bronchitis or asthma
symptoms). We follow here the valuation of additional morbidity proposed in the NEEDS update of
ExternE. Their values range from €1 for each use of bronchodilator to €200,000 per new case of
chronic bronchitis.
Crop losses are valued at the international market prices. The impacts on building materials are
assessed using replacement and maintenance costs, the assessment of biodiversity impacts is based
on restoration costs.
We use country-specific impacts valued by EU-wide social damage costs to express them in €2005
per ton of emission of pollutant as estimated by the project NEEDS. We include the most common air
pollutants (SO2, NOx, PM2.5, PM10, NMVOC) and heavy metals (As, Cd, Cr, Hg, Ni, Pb). NEEDS provides
the average value of external costs per ton of emission for a total of 39 European and non-European
countries.12
The marginal social cost of emissions of heavy metals is developed in NEEDS using data from the EUfunded project ESPREME (2007) and from two studies (Fantke 2008; Spadaro and Rabl 2007). Since
the background concentration of NOX, SO2, NMVOC and NH3 influences the generation of secondary
pollutants – e.g. ozone, sulphates, nitrates – the NEEDS project provides two sets of impact estimates
for non-metals: one in 2010 and the other in 2020 (see, Preiss and Klotz 2008). The EU-wide average
external cost of pollution is reported in Table 1.
Pollutant

PM2.5

PMcoarse

NOX

SO2

NMVOC

Cd

As

Ni

Pb

Hg

Cr

Emission scenario 2010

12.08

0.52

5.84

6.54

1.01

84.69

536

1.67

284

8371

9.90

Emission scenario 2020

11.10

0.43

6.00

6.55

0.52

74.59

472

1.47

251

7372

8.72

Note: Monetary values in €2005 per ton of emitted pollutant. PMcoarse indicates particulate matters with an aerodynamic
diameter between 2.5 and 10 µm. Source: Preiss and Klotz (2008).

Table 1. Average damage factors for air quality pollutants and heavy metals for the 2010 and 2020
background emission scenarios (thousands €2005 per ton).

As an example, Figure 1 presents the EU-wide impacts of one additional unit of PM2.5 released in any
EU country, in 2010 and in 2020. The figure also displays the EU average marginal cost of PM2.5. The
marginal cost of pollution in Figure 1 is the EU-wide social cost of pollution. The social cost differs
across countries because of different environmental conditions, different density of receptors, and
different characteristics of the receptors. For instance, the unit damage cost of PM2.5 is much smaller
(about 4,000 € per ton) in countries with lower population density in their neighbouring countries
(Finland, Norway, or Sweden) than in countries (Benelux, Germany) at the centre of a heavily
populated region (about 20,000 € per ton).
The cost of pollution for Europe is equal to the sum of the cost attributable to fuel use and hence
emissions released from their burning in each of the 28 European countries. The released emissions

12

The costs were estimated using several runs of the EcoSenseWeb tool with the EMEP/MSC-West Eulerian
pollution dispersion model.
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have an effect on receptors (humans, species, assets) in the 28 European countries but they also
affect emission receptors in the rest of the world. Using the EcoSenseWeb tool, we derive the cost of
one additional unit of pollution released in country i that is inflicted to each of the remaining
European countries j and to the rest of the world (j+1). In our case, this procedure generates 28 x 29
pollution costs. We assume that the distribution of impacts due to emissions releases from country i,
i.e. regional increase in ambient concentrations, remains same over the whole period 2015-2100 as
in the reference year. In other words, we do not model meteorological conditions and transport of
pollutants over time.

25

thous. €

20
15
10

5

FIN
NOR
SWE
PRT
EST
LVA
IRL
LTU
ESP
GRC
DNK
BGR
CYP
ROU
GBR
ITA
SVN
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AUT
POL
CHE
CZE
FRA
HUN
LUX
BEL
NLD
DEU

0

PM2.5 2010
EU average 2010

PM2.5 2020
EU average 2020

Source: Preiss and Klotz (2008).

Figure 1. Damage factors per ton of PM2.5 for 2010 and 2020 background emission scenario (thousands €2005
per ton).

3.3 Linking the WITCH model and the ExternE approach
The ancillary benefits of reducing GHG emissions are derived using data on fossil fuels consumption
for power generation (EN) from WITCH. WITCH provides energy scenarios for Eastern and Western
Europe until 2100. In order to provide country-level scenarios of fossil fuels combustion for power
generation (ENf,j) we assume that the current distribution of power generation across countries
remains unchanged.13 Emission factors (EF) from fossil fuels used for power generation are from the
EMEP EEA air pollutant emission inventory guidebook (EMEP/EEA, 2013) and are listed in Table A - 1
in the Appendix. The damage factors (DF) for each pollutant are from the Impact Pathway Analysis of

13

Primary energy use in country j equals to (ENf shj), where ENf denotes primary energy use for electricity
generation in one of the two European regions from WITCH and shj indicates the share of country j on use of
fuel f, as it was in the base year 2005.
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ExternE. We assume that damage factors change after 2015, following the assumptions in the
EcoSenseweb software.
There are five channels through which both GHG and air quality emissions can be reduced: (1)
reducing total economic output (scale effect), (2) restructuring the economy towards less emissionintensive sectors (composition effect), (3) reducing the fuel intensity of production (fuel intensity
effect), (4) using fuels with reduced or no carbon emissions (fuel mix effect), and (5) utilizing more
efficient end-of-pipe technologies (emission-fuel intensity effect).14 By linking WITCH and IPA we are
able to take into account channel (1); channel (2) is also accounted for, but it cannot be separated
from (3) because WITCH has only one aggregate final good sector; the mix of the capital-labour
aggregate with energy is instead optimally determined in WITCH; channels (4) and (5) are also
accounted for.
The change of the fuel mix responds to changes in the cost of fuels and of power generation capital
and to the carbon tax penalty. However, WITCH does not track non-GHG emissions.15 As the nonGHG emission factors for fuels (EFf) remain constant over the entire period, it implies time invariant
efficacy of the end-of-pipe abatement technologies and hence constant emissions per unit of fuel
over time.
As noted above, in ExternE the willingness to pay used to derive the damage factors reflects EU
average values, implicitly assuming that all Europeans share the same preference for avoiding
adverse health and other negative impacts.
The real value of pollution costs (PC) attributable to air polluting emissions released by country i in
year t is derived as follows:
𝑌𝑗

𝐸𝑈

𝑤𝑡𝑝

𝜀𝑦

𝑃𝐶𝑡,𝑖 = ∑𝑗 ∑𝑓 ∑𝑝(𝐸𝑁𝑗,𝑓 ∙ 𝐸𝐹𝑓,𝑝 ∙ 𝐷𝐹𝑗,𝑝 ) ∙ (𝑌 )

𝑤𝑡𝑝

∙ ∏𝑡𝑠=2005(1 + 𝑔𝑠 ∙ 𝜀𝑦

)

(1)

where f denotes the fuel type (coal, gas, oil, biomass, nuclear, renewable energy), p denotes the
pollutant (SO2, NOx, PM, NMVOC, heavy metals). For each country i, the cost of air pollution is
determined summing damages in each own country and on all other ‘victim’ countries j. We sum the
damage of emissions on each other and 28 European countries plus the rest of Europe16, including ith
country, in that airborne concentrations are changed due to emissions released from the emitting
country i. Thus, the first term in equation (1) (𝐸𝑁𝑓,𝑗 ∙ 𝐸𝐹𝑓,p ∙ 𝐷𝐹𝑝,𝑗 ) quantifies the external cost of
non-GHG emissions released by country i. Our impact assessment follows a static approach: neither
of the parameters on emission-fuel factors (EFf,p), damage factors (DFp,j), country’s share on fuel use
wtp
(shj), or εy are time invariant. Then, the second and the third terms adjust for the differences in
income levels across 28 European countries, and over time, respectively. These adjustments are
based on a simple benefit transfer that assumes that richer people are willing to pay more – not
necessarily strictly proportionally – than poor people. The second term translates the EU average
value into the values that are more relevant to a ‘victim’ country j, where Yj and YEU are real per

14

Carbon capture and sequestration is an end-of-pipe technology for GHG emission reductions.
A new version of the model with local pollutants and other non-GHG emissions was under preparation while
this article was written.
16
To analyse the distribution of the impacts, country-specific damage factors and external costs are derived for
28 countries. We have data on the EU28 countries, with the exceptions of Malta and Croatia. We include also
Norway and Switzerland. The impacts on the rest of the world are valued as if they were born in the emitting
country.
15
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capita GDP in purchasing power standards in country j, or in the EU, respectively, in the year 2005. As
a result we monetize physical impacts by country-specific values, instead of using an EU-average
value (e.g. Holland et al. 2011). The third term adjusts for possible changes in income over time in
wtp
the ‘victim’ country. εy denotes the income elasticity of willingness to pay, for which we use a
value equal to 0.8, similarly (OECD 2012b, 2014; WHO and OECD 2015).17 The parameter gp is real
growth in per capita GDP, as endogenously determined by WITCH for the two European regions. No
equity weighting is assumed in our calculation of pollution costs.
Several adjustments are made to ensure the comparability of monetary values and to guarantee
consistency between the two modelling approaches. The WITCH model provides results in 2005 USD,
while the pollution costs in the ExternE are expressed in 2000 €. All values are converted to 2005 € by
using the GDP deflator and the market exchange rate for 2005. In order to compare the ancillary
benefits with economic impacts expressed in present value, the ancillary benefits are discounted
using the interest rate endogenously determined in WITCH.18
We repeat this exercise for a set of climate mitigation scenarios recently developed. We follow
Riekkola et al. (2011) and express the ancillary benefits as the difference between the air pollution
damages in the baseline scenario and in the policy scenario. For each policy scenario we calculate the
absolute benefit of pollution reduction, the benefit per ton of CO2 emissions abated in the European
electricity sector, the ratio between air pollution ancillary benefits and total CO2 abatement cost in
the electricity sector, and the benefit as a ratio of the global carbon price.

4

Scenarios

In this study we use four climate mitigation policy scenarios developed using WITCH for the EUfunded project GLOBAL-IQ (Massetti et al. 2014). The Reference scenario assumes the continuation
of observed trends. We assume that there is no policy to reduce GHG emissions in the Reference
scenario. We then use three climate policy scenarios in which emissions decline over time to achieve
three levels of radiative forcing in 2100: 6.0, 4.5 and 2.6 watts/m2 (they correspond to concentrations
equal to 850, 650, and 490 ppm CO2eq). These scenarios are named RCP6.0, RCP4.5 and RCP2.6
because the radiative forcing levels are those used in the Representative Concentration Pathways
(RCP) (Van Vuuren et al. 2011).
The RCPs have been recently developed to provide greenhouse gases emissions scenarios to the
climate models that have been used to generate the most recent set of climate change scenarios
(Stocker et al. 2013). The RCPs are the new standard in the climate change literature and are now
being complemented by a set of socio-economic scenarios, the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways
(SSP) (Ebi et al. 2014, Van Vuuren et al. 2014).

17

The OECD (2012b) review finds that the income elasticity of the VSL is in the range of 0.7 and 0.9 in most of
the regressions that use screening criteria. In other studies this range is substantially lower – about 0.3 to 0.4.
Viscusi (2000) finds studies that use a value greater than unity. In most studies the income elasticity of the VSL
ranges between 0 and 1 and the income elasticity of WTP around unity may be justified for the transfers
between countries with heterogeneous income (Czajkowski and Ščasný 2010).
18
In WITCH the pure rate of time preference declines over time. It starts at 3 % p.a. in 2005 and declines to
about 2 % p.a. in 2100. The interest rate of the economy declines over time following the Euler equation. The
model is calibrated so that developed regions have an interest rate equal to about 5% per year in 2005 while
developing regions have an interest rate equal to 7% per year in 2005.
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Each RCP scenario may be the outcome of different socioeconomic pathways. For example, a high
emission scenario may be the outcome of both a fast-growing but highly efficient global economy
and of a sluggish and inefficient global economy. Analogously, the same emission trajectory (RCP)
may be consistent with both high and low global economic inequalities.
The Reference scenario used in this study reproduces population and economic growth of the SSP2
scenario. The SSP2 is a central-case scenario because current trends are assumed to continue
indefinitely in the future. The SSP2 is commonly identified as the “Middle of the road” scenario.19
In our Reference scenario population and economic growth follow the trends observed in the past.
There are considerable energy efficiency improvements in the Reference scenario, but global energy
demand substantially increases as a result of economic and population growth. Without any global
agreement to reduce greenhouse gases emissions this incremental energy demand is mainly covered
using fossil fuels. The carbon dioxide emissions from the use of fossil fuels are the main source of
additional GHGs that are released in the atmosphere in the Reference scenario. The power sector is
one of the largest contributors to CO2 emissions. In 2010 about 10 Gt CO2 are released from power
plants at global level, of which 1.4 Gt originate from Europe. This is equivalent to about 30% of total
CO2 emissions. The carbon intensity of the European power sector declines up to 2030 and then it
climbs again as coal re-gains a share of the power mix. In 2050 emissions are equal to 1.1 Gt CO2 per
year (24% of European CO2 emissions) and in 2100 emissions from the power sector total 1.7 Gt CO2
per year (35% of European CO2 emissions) (see Figure 2).
The climate module used by WITCH indicates that radiative forcing achieves 6.6 W/m2 in 2100 in the
Reference scenario. The global mean temperature increases by 4.1 °C in 2100, with respect to the
pre-industrial level.
Emissions sharply decline in the RCP scenarios. While the RCP6.0 is only marginally different from the
SSP2 scenario, the RCP4.5, and especially the RPC2.6 scenarios indicate that it is optimal to drastically
cut emissions from power generation. Coal and natural gas power plants are retrofitted with carbon
capture and storage equipment while investments in wind and solar power increase. Investments in
end-use energy efficiency R&D reduce the demand of energy and of electricity in particular. As early
as in 2040 emissions in the RCP2.6 scenario become negative because biomass (carbon neutral) is
burnt in power plants with carbon capture and storage. Thus the power sector quickly shifts from
being a major source of emissions to being a net sink.

19

The Reference scenario is thus characterized by: (1) slowly decreasing fossil fuel dependency, (2) reductions
of resource and energy intensity, (3) uneven development of low-income countries, (4) weak global
institutions, (5) slow continuation of globalization, with some barriers remaining, (6) well regulated information
flow, (7) medium economic growth, slow convergence, (8) high intra-regional disparities, (9) medium
population growth related to medium educational investments, (10) delay of achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs).
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Figure 2. Global and European carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels used in the power sector.

All the RCP scenarios assume full technological flexibility. For example carbon capture and
sequestration is deployed on a large scale starting from 2020. Biomass is assumed to be widely
available. Energy efficiency gains, although costly, greatly contribute to the reduction of electricity
demand. The energy system as a whole is assumed to quickly adapt to the new regulatory regime. In
order to test the effect of a less flexible technological setup on local pollution we also use three
scenarios in which technological adaptation is limited (see Massetti et al. 2014, Leimbach et al.
2014). These are limited adaptation scenarios (LA). We calculate the new carbon price that is
consistent with the RCP4.5 scenario and we assess how the technology mix and the distribution of
emissions changes across technologies and across sectors (total emissions are unchanged because
we still impose the long-term climate target to be achieved). Specifically, we consider three
additional scenarios: with limited energy efficiency (LA-EE), limited renewable energy (LA-REN) and
limited supply and trade of biomass (LA-BIO). For the limited adaptation scenarios we calculate
emissions reductions and climate mitigation policy costs using a ‘limited adaptation’ Reference
scenario with the same technology constraint as in the policy scenario. We are particularly interested
in whether there is any meaningful difference in local pollution as a consequence of constraints to
key mitigation technologies.

5

Results

5.1 Economic impacts
In all climate mitigation scenarios our policy tool is a uniform – over countries, sectors and GHG
emissions – carbon tax. The time path of the carbon taxes is shown in Figure 3.20 The policy starts in
2015 and with the RCP6.0, RCP4.5 and RCP2.6 scenarios the global mean temperature increases by
3.7°C, 3.0 °C and 2.0°C, respectively. In the RCP6.0 case, the carbon tax starts at 3 USD/tCO2eq and
achieves 14 USD/tCO2eq in 2100. The level of the tax is very low because the RCP6.0 target is not far
from the Reference scenario. The carbon tax for the RCP4.5 reaches 335/tCO2eq USD in 2100. Due to
limited technology adaptation, the level of the carbon tax is 10% higher in LA-BIO and by 31% higher
in LA-EE in 2100, but it is almost identical in LA-REN. The variations of the carbon tax reflect the
relative importance of alternative mitigation channels. The tax escalates in RCP2.6 and reaches more
than 3,500 USD/tCO2eq in 2100. The tax is recycled lump-sum in each region. Nothing but the price
of carbon is changed with respect to the corresponding reference scenarios.

20

The three carbon tax trajectories are consistent with the radiative forcing targets. They are not socially
optimal taxes because they are obtained solving the model in the cost-effectiveness mode.
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Notes: RCP6.0 on the secondary vertical axis.
Figure 3. The carbon tax – policy scenario.

As it becomes more and more expensive to emit GHG emissions, the model scenario projects
investment in carbon-free technologies for the energy sector, in energy efficiency R&D, in R&D to
develop carbon-free backstop technologies, it substitutes the energy input with capital and labour
and it invests in a series of activities to reduce CO2 emissions from deforestation and other non-CO2
gases. The resulting emissions trajectories are the optimal (efficient) solution of a complex intertemporal and strategic optimization problem. Feedback from technology spillovers and from global
energy markets are internalized in the solution of each regional social planner.
Emissions reductions in the power sector are the result of reduced demand due to higher efficiency
and factor substitution in end uses and of decarbonization of the fuel mix. Fossils fuels without
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) are progressively phased out by nuclear, renewables, and
fossil fuel power plants with CCS. When the carbon tax is high, bioenergy with CCS plays an
important role. Coal power plants without CCS disappear by the end of the century in both the
RCP4.5 and the RCP2.6 scenarios. The RCP2.6 scenario is so stringent that coal with CCS is also
progressively phased-out because the penalty on the uncaptured emissions is very expensive. Thus
climate policy also delivers local environmental benefits by greatly reducing harmful emissions
released during coal combustion. Figure 4 illustrates how the power generation mix evolves over the
century in the Reference and in the climate policy scenarios.
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Figure 4. The electricity generation mix at global level (left column) and in the EU (right column).
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Notes: costs discounted using the endogenous interest rate of the model.
Figure 5. Consumption and GDP losses in the tax scenarios.

We note that in the limited technology scenarios we still achieve the same target for overall radiative
forcing and hence for carbon concentrations of the full flexibility scenarios. The only differences
between the full flexibility scenario and scenario with limited adaptation are the technology mix and
the cost of the policy. Emissions from the power sector are also different, as we document below.
All the mitigation measures implemented in the tax scenarios are costly because they reduce the
overall efficiency of the economy. As a result economic growth is slower in the tax scenarios and
aggregated consumption and GDP decline with respect to the Reference scenario. Figure 5 shows the
aggregated consumption and GDP losses from 2010 to 2100, evaluated using the endogenous
interest rate calculated in WITCH. These costs are not net of the economic benefit of reduced global
warming and of reduced local pollution.
Consumption and GDP losses at global level range from almost zero in the RCP6.0 scenario to about
5% and 6% in the RCP2.6 scenario, respectively. In Europe the cost of the RCP2.6 scenario is lower
than at global level, and it is equal to about 2% in terms of consumption and about 3% in terms of
GDP.

5.2 Impact on emissions
Each climate mitigation scenario results in a remarkable decrease in the total volume of polluting
emissions, with the exception of PM2.5 and nickel emissions (Table 2). The increase in these two
pollutants is a consequence of substituting fossil fuels with biomass, for which the EMEP/EEA
inventory reports the highest emission factors among all fuels. As biomass is carbon neutral, it
becomes a viable alternative to fossil fuels in all mitigation scenarios. In particular, the RCP2.6
scenario has a very large use of biomass with carbon capture and sequestration to compensate for
emissions in other sectors. As a consequence, the RCP2.6 scenario displays the largest increase in
PM2.5 pollutants.
In the RCP4.5 scenarios with limited technological adaptation, emissions of air pollutants change,
although not dramatically. The only exception is PM2.5 when supply and trade of biomass is limited
(RCP4.5-BIO). The fully flexible scenario (RCP4.5) leads to an increase of PM2.5 emissions equal to
3,056 kt (with respect to the Reference scenario), while the constrained scenario leads to a reduction
of 9 kt of PM2.5 (with respect to the constrained Reference scenario). Annual changes in emissions of
PM2.5 and SO2 for each climate mitigation scenarios are displayed in Figure 6.

16
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper928

18

Š?asný et al.: Quantifying the Ancillary Benefits of the Representative Con

NMVOC
(kt)

NOx
(Mt)

PM2.5
(kt)

SOx
(Mt)

Cd
(t)

As
(t)

Ni
(t)

Pb
(t)

Hg
(t)

Cr
(t)

CO2
(Gt)

RCP2.6

-724

-182

13,686

-640

-494

-4,376

-7,904

-3,078

-923

-2,362

-120

RCP4.5

-574

-91

3,056

-306

-268

-2,385

3,775

-2,083

-504

-1,403

-74

RCP6.0

-345

-33

-144

-97

-94

-861

4,516

-864

-186

-538

-17

RCP4.5-EFFIC

-365

-86

3,890

-314

-273

-2,370

253

-1,997

-492

-1,376

-80

RCP4.5-REN

-323

-72

2,989

-261

-232

-1,981

-837

-1,687

-409

-1,154

-65

RCP4.5-BIO

-481

-71

-9

-247

-257

-2,078

-1,018

-2,037

-420

-1,285

-65

Scenario

Table 2. Cumulative difference in emission volumes in Europe for each climate mitigation scenario compared
to the corresponding reference scenario for the period 2015 – 2100.

Figure 6. Annual change in emission volumes of PM2.5 (left) and SO2 (right) for Europe for each climate
mitigation scenario.

5.3 Ancillary benefits in total and per ton of abated CO2
The ancillary benefits of climate mitigation are displayed in Table 3. The first two columns display
total CO2 emissions (CO2) and total local pollution costs (PC). The third and the fourth column present
the change of CO2 emissions (∆CO2) and the ancillary benefits (AB=∆PC). The fifth column displays
ancillary benefits per reduced ton of CO2 (AB/∆CO2). All results are relevant to Europe only and all
nominal values are expressed in present value of 2005 Euro, discounted using the endogenous
interest rate from the WITCH model.
In the RCP2.6 scenario the level of CO2-eq concentrations is kept at 490 ppm thanks to a massive
reduction of GHG emissions compared to the Reference scenario (120 Gt over the period 20152100). Due to this sharp reduction of GHG emissions also local pollution collapses and the discounted
cost of pollution over the century drops from €3,394B to €816B (76% reduction). The ancillary
benefits are higher than €2,500B, which implies an average benefit of about €21.6 per abated ton of
CO2-eq. in Europe. The RCP4.5 generates the second largest ancillary benefits, amounting to more
than €1,061B. These benefits result from 31% cumulative reduction in the pollution cost in Europe.
CO2 emissions are reduced by 73 Gt in the RCP4.5 scenario, which implies 14.4€/tCO2-eq of local
benefits per abated. The RCP6.0 – with only 15% CO2-eq reduction and 9% reduction of the pollution
costs – leads to one order of magnitude smaller cumulative ancillary benefits than the RCP2.6. The
magnitude of the ancillary benefits per ton of CO2-eq avoided is, however, very similar. This result is
explained by the strong similarity of the power generation mix across the three scenarios. The share
of total emissions reductions from the power sector is also rather constant across scenarios. The
RCP4.5 scenarios with limited adaptation have ancillary benefits that are similar to those found for
17
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the unconstrained RCP4.5 scenario. Our results are in line with other studies (see Section 2), but our
study covers a longer time horizon, it considers more abatement options and more climate policy
scenarios.

Full technological flexibility
Reference scenario
SSP2
Climate policy scenarios
RCP2.6
RCP4.5
RCP6.0
Limited technologies
Reference scenario
SSP2-EFFIC
SSP2-REN
SSP2-BIO
Climate policy scenario
RCP4.5-EFFIC
RCP4.5-REN
RCP4.5-BIO

(1)
CO2
Mt

(2)
PC
€bn.

118,396

3,394

-1,144
44,465
101,807

816
2,333
3,090

118,361
109,371
108,453

3,545
3,321
3,299

38,614
44,532
43,299

2,397
2,352
2,345

(3)
∆ CO2
Mt

(4)
AB
€bn.

(5)
AB/∆CO2
€

-119,540
-73,931
-16,589

-2,578
-1,061
-304

21.56
14.35
18.33

-79,746
-64,839
-65,155

-1,148
-969
-954

14.40
14.94
14.65

Notes: Cumulative and discounted over the period 2015-2100 (Euro 2005).

Table 3. Present value of ancillary benefits in Europe for climate mitigation scenarios.

Table 3 displays discounted ancillary benefits. Without discounting, climate mitigation yields in
Europe, on average, ancillary benefits in the range of €36 (RCP4.5) to €50 (RCP6.0) per abated ton of
CO2eq for the whole period until 2100. Ancillary benefits of the stricter mitigation (RCP2.6) are about
44 €/tCO2eq during 2015-2050 and after 2080 the benefits are over €50 per ton. Benefits for the
RCP4.5 scenario follow an inverted U-shape form; the benefits are about 30 € per ton until 2025,
then they are rising at €60 level around 2040-2044, and then they again go down reaching €27 per
ton CO2eq in the 2080’s. Under mild climate mitigation (RCP6.0), the ancillary benefits start at around
€30, then they reach €50. In absolute terms, total benefits, as cumulated over the period 2015-2100,
are slightly over €5,600B (RCP2.6), €2,600B in RCP4.5, and only about €800B in RCP6.0.
We then compare ancillary benefits (AB) and the total cost of electricity generation (TC), both
discounted and in present values. Table 4 displays both benefits and costs as cumulated over the
period that always starts from 2015 and ends in the year at the end of given period. Both are derived
as a difference with respect to the corresponding Reference scenario. For the whole period 20152100, the ancillary benefits exceed the additional cost of electricity generation in the RCP2.6 as well
as in the RCP4.5; the RCP6.0 results in cost savings.
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RCP2.6
2019
2024
2029
2034
2039
2044
2049
2059
2069
2079
2089
2099
2100
ratio AB/TC

RCP4.5

RCP6.0

RCP4.5-EFFIC

RCP4.5-REN

RCP4.5-BIOM

AB

TC

AB

TC

AB

TC

AB

TC

AB

TC

AB

TC

237
440
637
833
1,009
1,171
1,316
1,584
1,830
2,070
2,308
2,552
2,578

-59
-70
-20
33
104
180
268
447
660
882
1,119
1,349
1,375

8
20
81
187
291
393
489
652
773
880
970
1,052
1,061

19
67
128
177
232
277
258
307
259
207
144
62
54

7
17
69
142
207
262
301
357
378
396
373
311
304

18
51
77
96
104
105
95
68
18
-71
-205
-360
-379

1
5
28
77
145
218
290
430
568
702
884
1,121
1,148

2
34
82
140
191
181
204
223
305
431
624
786
817

1
4
24
68
115
173
240
369
491
605
757
947
969

2
27
68
106
160
214
215
309
335
403
522
683
703

1
4
25
69
119
184
250
378
502
619
761
935
954

2
28
70
111
172
219
222
248
302
374
459
547
564

1.87

19.56

-0.80

1.41

1.38

1.69

Note: Present value of cumulative benefits and costs up to the year indicated in the first column. AB – ancillary benefits, TC
– total costs of electricity generation. All monetary values in Billion Euro 2005.

Table 4. Present value of cumulative ancillary benefits and total costs of electricity generation in Europe,
2015-2100.

Table 5 provides a comparison between the undiscounted (real) value of ancillary benefits and the
carbon price per ton of CO2 for each climate mitigation scenario and their progress until 2100. RCP6.0
implies the lowest carbon price, from €2 to €12 per ton of CO2eq. We can also find that, on average
for the whole period, ancillary benefits per ton of CO2eq are 7-times larger than the carbon price.
Due to higher carbon prices in stricter climate mitigation scenarios, this ratio is only 0.5 in RCP4.5 and
0.06 in RCP2.6. Our results are however still in line with other studies; for instance Grossman et al.
(2011) found the ratio of ancillary benefits on permit price in a range between 40% and 250% in 2015
(with CO2 price at $29), and between 18% and 125% in 2030 ($61).
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RCP2.6

RCP4.5

RCP6.0

RCP4.5-EFFIC

RCP4.5-REN

RCP4.5-BIOM

AB

AB/CO2

p/CO2

AB

AB/CO2

p/CO2

AB

AB/CO2

p/CO2

AB

AB/CO2

p/CO2

AB

AB/CO2

p/CO2

AB

AB/CO2

p/CO2

bn. €

€

€

bn. €

€

€

bn. €

€

€

bn. €

€

€

bn. €

€

€

bn. €

€

€

2015-19

291

48

104

7

33

11

6

32

2

2

44

15

1

50

11

1

50

12

2020-24

568

44

129

22

29

13

18

26

3

7

45

18

6

45

13

6

45

14

2025-29

846

43

159

95

47

16

77

51

3

43

51

22

37

52

16

37

51

18

2030-34

1,140

44

194

243

60

20

170

54

3

122

69

27

108

72

20

109

71

21

2035-39

1,434

43

238

409

59

24

270

53

4

241

72

33

191

70

24

197

70

26

2040-44

1,733

43

292

593

60

30

364

53

4

377

60

40

299

71

30

318

72

32

2045-49

2,032

43

357

792

57

36

449

51

4

521

40

49

435

64

37

453

60

39

2050-59

2,644

44

436

1,171

43

44

591

49

5

827

34

59

718

44

44

734

42

48

2060-69

3,300

46

655

1,522

32

65

698

45

6

1,167

30

86

1,016

32

65

1,036

29

70

2070-79

4,010

48

982

1,872

28

95

785

43

7

1,559

29

125

1,354

29

96

1,373

28

103

2080-89

4,756

51

1,460

2,219

27

138

829

49

9

2,051

31

182

1,757

30

138

1,758

29

151

2090-99

5,555

55

2,128

2,598

28

198

829

-1*

10

2,674

34

261

2,259

32

199

2,202

31

218

2100

5,639

58

2,951

2,638

30

281

825

25*

12

2,749

36

370

2,317

34

283

2,255

33

311

average AB/CO2

47.17

35.69

49.75

34.47

35.73

34.61

ratio AB/price

0.06

0.52

7.11

0.41

0.59

0.53

Note: AB – cumulative ancillary benefits over the period 2015 until the end of the year shown on the respective line (for instance, 2030-39 indicates the benefits over 2015 to 2039). AB/CO2 –
average ancillary benefits per ton reduced CO2 in given period; p/CO2 – carbon price per ton CO2; all values in real undiscounted 2005 Euro. The indicators related to CO2 emissions are
expressing average annual value for given period shown in the first column. * Starting from 2090, CO2 emissions are slightly higher than in the SSP2 reference scenario. In 2100, RCP6.0
generates ancillary damage, instead of benefits, but they are negligible in size.

Table 5. Real values of (cumulative) ancillary benefits, average annual ancillary benefits and carbon price per ton of CO2eq abated, 2015-2100 (values in Euro 2005).
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5.4 Ancillary benefits for European countries: winners and losers
Lastly, we are interested in understanding the distribution of the ancillary benefits of climate change
mitigation policy across European countries. Unfortunately we do not have country-by-country
energy scenarios. WITCH separates Europe in two large blocs: Western and Eastern Europe. We build
energy scenarios for 28 European countries assuming that each country’s share of the total regional
energy use remains constant over time and under alternative climate mitigation policies. Following
equation 1, we compute pollution costs for each of the 28 countries that are born by each and every
other European country and by people living outside of the 28 European countries. Having 28 x 29
pollution cost values, we can then derive total pollution costs that are associated with impacts on
emission receptors in (1) country i due to emissions released by the same country, (2) other
European countries j (j≠i) and 3) the rest of Europe that are due to emissions released by country i. It
is then straightforward to derive the pollution costs – both due to domestic (1) or imported pollution
(2) – for any country in Europe. Burden exported from Europe is measured by (3).
The total value of ancillary benefits for the RCP2.6 scenario between 2015 and 2100 is estimated to
be equal to €2,578B and about 73% of these benefits have a domestic origin, that is, the local
benefits are enjoyed by residents of the European country in which the abatement in local air
ambient pollution occurs. The remaining share of ancillary benefits is divided between beneficiaries
from European countries (€570B, about 22%) and beneficiaries from rest of the world (€134B, about
5%).
Switching to a country-level analysis, we find that (1) each of the 28 European countries is better off
in terms of air quality improvement if RCP2.6 mitigation policy is implemented. In absolute terms,
European countries benefit between 2015 and 2100 from a modest 88m € (in Cyprus) to 1,192B € (in
Germany). (2) Countries’ shares of abatement effort and share of the benefits that are enjoyed by
their residents vary significantly, as shown in Figure 7. Germany generates the largest share of the
ancillary benefits, about 44%, followed by the United Kingdom with a contribution of 17%, Italy and
Poland both with 6%. These countries also enjoy the largest shares of local benefits. Half of the 28
European countries do not contribute more that 5% to total ancillary benefits, but also do not enjoy
more than 5% of the total ancillary benefits. (3) In three European countries – Switzerland, Lithuania
and Sweden – the RCP2.6 mitigation scenario results in higher non-GHG emissions than in the
Reference case and as a result the generated ancillary benefits are negative in these countries, i.e.
RCP2.6 generates damage; thanks to reduced import of emission air quality would be overall also
improved.
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Notes: RCP2.6 scenario. Percentage of EU reduction of costs.

Figure 7. Countries’ contribution to total ancillary benefits and to total effort of their generation in Europe.

From Figure 8 it is also possible to infer which countries are net externality producers and which
countries are instead net beneficiaries. We define net producers of the ancillary benefits those
countries whose share of total benefits generated in Europe is larger than their share of total
benefits that are enjoyed by its residents. For example, Bulgaria’s contribution to cumulative
ancillary benefits due to its non-GHG emission reductions is 0.8% of the total benefits in Europe
(€20.7B), while Bulgarians receive only 0.1% of total ancillary benefits in Europe (€2.5B). This implies
that Bulgaria contributes more to overall ancillary benefits in Europe than it receives in the RCP2.6
scenario. Such a country can be considered to relatively lose out as a result of the GHG mitigation
policy, although we highlight that each country is better off with respect to overall pollution costs in
RCP4.5. Estonia, Ireland and Slovenia face the same situation as Bulgaria. Cyprus, Portugal, Finland,
Romania, Czech Republic, Greece, Poland and Denmark belong among the net producers as well, but
their relative contribution to the overall ancillary benefits is not as large compared to their share of
benefits that their residents would enjoy as it is in the first group of net producing countries. The
contribution of large countries, such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain, or the United Kingdom, but
also of the Netherlands, Slovakia and Hungary is roughly equivalent to their benefits. Belgium,
Austria, Latvia, Norway and Luxemburg are the relative winners in Europe since they all receive more
ancillary benefits than they generate.

Figure 8. Contribution to ancillary benefits generated relative to the share of benefits that a country would
enjoy in RCP2.6, 2015-2100.
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The left panel of Figure 9 displays the percentage of ancillary benefits that result from emission
reduction in one country which are ‘exported’ elsewhere. The rest of the benefits have a domestic
origin, i.e. they happen due to emission abatement in the same country. The right panel shows
‘imported’ ancillary benefits as a fraction of total ancillary benefits. These benefits are enjoyed
thanks to the emission reductions in other countries. For instance, emission reductions in Italy will
mainly benefit the local population and local assets. Only 11% of ancillary benefits are ‘exported’ to
other countries. Cyprus, Italy, Spain or Greece do not benefit much from emission reductions in other
countries. Most of the benefits in Luxembourg, Latvia, Norway or Belgium are instead due to the
external emissions reductions. In the case of Sweden, Lithuania and Switzerland the share exceeds
100% which describes a situation when ‘imported’ benefits exceed total benefits. This happens when
ancillary benefits due to domestic abatement are negative, that is when the RCP2.6 climate
mitigation policy increases local pollution.

Figure 9. Exported (left panel) and imported (right panel) ancillary benefits from pollution reduction.

6

Conclusions and remarks

This paper presents estimates of the air quality ancillary benefits of GHG emission reductions. We
consider three climate policy scenarios that achieve three standard radiative forcing levels in 2100:
6.0, 4.5 and 2.6 W/m2. These three levels correspond to concentrations of GHG equal to 850, 650,
and 490 ppm CO2 equivalent, which result in global mean temperature increases of 3.7°C, 3.0°C and
2.0°C, respectively. These radiative forcing targets are achieved by introducing a uniform tax on all
GHG emissions in the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH, assuming full as well as limited
technological flexibility. Our scenarios cover the whole world for the period 2015-2100, however, we
assess only ancillary benefits from emissions reductions in electricity generation in Europe.
As emitting GHG becomes more expensive, WITCH projects investment in carbon-free technologies
for the energy sector, energy efficiency and R&D to develop carbon-free backstop technologies,
substitutes the energy input with other factors and invests in a series of activities to reduce CO 2
emissions from deforestation and other non-CO2 gases. As a result economic growth is slower in the
tax scenarios. In Europe, mitigation policies are usually less costly than in other regions of the world,
with cumulated consumption and GDP losses amounting to about 2% and 3% in the RCP2.6 scenario,
respectively, if a discount rate based on the endogenous interest rate of WITCH is applied. Compared
to the Reference scenario, until 2100 cumulative GHG emissions are reduced by 14% in the RCP6.0,
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but they are 62% smaller in the RCP4.5 and RCP2.6 leads even to negative cumulative GHG emissions
due to the use of biomass with carbon capture and sequestration.
The resulting consumption patterns of fossil fuels in the European electricity sector are used to
estimate the physical and economic benefits of pollution reductions on human health and on key
assets by implementing the most advanced version of the ExternE methodology with its Impact
Pathway Analysis. The ancillary benefits are derived as the difference between pollution costs for the
mitigation and the reference scenario, when impacts on human health, crop yield, materials, and
biodiversity associated with emissions of PM2.5, PM10, SO2, NOx, and NMVOC are considered.
In sum, our estimates of the ancillary benefits of reducing non-GHG polluting emissions in the
electricity sector in Europe are in line with estimates in the literature and very close to 33 € per ton
of CO2 abated, the mean value of the benefits reported in the review by Nemet et al. (2010) for
developed countries. Specifically, in the RCP2.6 mitigation scenario, we quantify these benefits in
Europe at more than €2.5T during 2015-2100, which implies average ancillary benefits of about
21.6 €/t CO2eq abated in the European electricity sector. Less strict scenarios generate overall
smaller local benefits, but the magnitude of ancillary benefits per ton of CO2eq abated is only slightly
smaller (€14.4, or €18.3, respectively) than under stricter mitigation. In real terms, without
discounting, the ancillary benefits are in the range of €36 to €50 per ton of CO2eq abated and the
unit value of the benefits for most mitigation scenarios slightly increases over time.
On average, ancillary benefits per ton of CO2eq abated in Europe are about 7-times larger than the
projected carbon price by WITCH for the RCP6.0 mitigation scenario. As the carbon price increases in
the RCP4.5, this ratio declines to 0.5, and it gets as low as 0.06 in the RCP2.6. A lower ratio for larger
carbon prices has been frequently documented elsewhere (Grossman et al. 2011) and our results are
in fact in line with general empirical evidence. For the whole period, cumulative ancillary benefits
also exceed cumulative additional cost of electricity generation in Europe, with an exception in the
RCP6.0 that actually results in overall cost savings in the power sector.
At country level we find that about 73% of total ancillary benefits attributable to the RCP2.6
mitigation scenario have a domestic origin, while the rest of the benefits are enjoyed in other
countries than in the one where the damaging emissions were abated. There are several key findings
worth mentioning: first, each of the 28 European countries is better off if RCP2.6 mitigation policy is
implemented, although the absolute value of the benefits varies significantly across countries,
reflecting their size, primary energy use, and fuel and technology mix to generate electricity. Second,
Germany is the key player; it contributes to ancillary benefits by about 44% and receives
approximately the same share of total ancillary benefits generated in Europe. Other large European
countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy and Poland also considerably contribute to total ancillary
benefits. Many other European countries are either small or have cleaner energy mixes and do not
contribute much to European-wide ancillary benefits. 14 out of 28 countries generate (and enjoy)
less than 5% of total European ancillary benefits. Third, there are relative winners and losers with
respect to ancillary benefits in Europe. Large European countries are neutral – they contribute to
ancillary benefits as much as they benefit. Hungary, Belgium, Austria, Latvia and Norway benefit
more than they contribute to ancillary benefits. Although Switzerland, Lithuania and Sweden
generate domestically ancillary damage rather than benefit, overall they win as well due to larger
ancillary benefits imported from other European countries.
Technologically constrained RCP4.5 scenarios lead to a higher price of carbon, but the price effect on
all emissions is relatively small compared to the emission predictions for the scenario with full
flexibility. Overall, limited flexibility in energy efficiency, biomass supply and renewable energy
technologies does not yield substantially different results from the ones that we obtain for the
mitigation scenario with full flexibility.
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The literature suggests that the ancillary benefits of climate mitigation can be very large and are thus
policy relevant. Our results confirm previous studies. As pointed out by Burtraw et al. (2003), not
considering ancillary benefits could lead to an incorrect assessment of the net costs of mitigation
policies and to an incorrect identification of ‘no regrets’ levels of GHG mitigation. For instance, Nam
et al. (2013), by using the EPPA5 model, found that if China achieves its SO2 and NOx emission
reduction targets, as proposed in its 12th Five Year Plan, the corresponding carbon-mitigation
potential exceeds China’s official 17% CO2 intensity reduction goal. Hence, if these ancillary benefits
can be measured in monetary terms, they should be included in the cost calculation of climate policy
(Davis et al. 2000). However some caveats apply.
First, in an ideal world each externality should be addressed using a specific tool. For example, most
of the externalities from fossil fuels combustion are additive and should be corrected using taxes on
fuel use that reflect the marginal cost of pollution (Heine et al. 2012).21 Efficient regulation thus
requires the imposition of a penalty on fuel use that is equal to the sum of the marginal cost of each
pollutant. Climate policy cannot substitute local pollution policies and vice versa. Unfortunately, this
efficient solution is rarely implemented. If local pollution effects are not internalized, a carbon tax
calibrated to reflect the marginal cost of carbon emissions has positive spillovers. If climate policy is
not implemented taxes aimed at reducing local pollution may have a positive global spillover if the
fuel mix shifts towards cleaner fuels. If local pollution is reduced using end-of-pipe technologies
carbon emissions may remain constant or may increase due to efficiency losses This externality
should be included in the cost calculations of local pollution policies.
Second, the existence of ancillary benefits should not be a reason for increasing the carbon tax or to
make climate regulation more stringent. The goal of carbon taxes is to reduce the climate externality
and the carbon price should be set to reflect the social cost of carbon. If climate policy also improves
air quality, then air quality policy can be less stringent than it would be if climate policy was not
implemented. This benefit of GHG mitigation should not be neglected but the social cost of carbon
does not change.
Finally, we appreciate Ian Parry’s et al. (2014) suggestion to “understand how much carbon emissions
reduction is in the self-interest of countries” and to derive nationally efficient carbon prices. We are
however more cautious than to call for “an approach that builds on national self-interest and spurs a
race to the top in low-carbon energy solutions” (Parry 2014.). It is true that policies regulating local
damage are more acceptable by the public than policies which have local costs but global benefits far
in the future. The focus on local benefits may increase the political acceptability of carbon taxes.
However, it remains unclear what would happen if the carbon tax had to increase above the level
that is deemed optimal to reduce local pollution. We find that the +2°C compatible scenario has a
carbon price that is always much higher than what would be justified by local benefits alone.
Although we do not account for all possible ancillary benefits, it seems plausible to assume that
pursuing local benefits alone will not keep the increase of global mean temperature below +2°C.
There are several limitations in our modelling approach that may require further research.

21

In some cases climate and local pollution have a multiplicative effect. For example ozone formation depends
on the joint combination of local pollutants and particular climatic conditions. However, these are special cases
that require special treatment. It is safe to assume that short-term climatic conditions are not affected by the
carbon tax and that long-term ozone formation is not affected by the present level concentrations of local
pollutants. The same reasoning applies to environmental regulation that aims to curb local pollutants.
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First, since the quantification of ancillary benefits is based on a soft-link of WITCH global model and
ExternE’s Impact Pathway Approach, there is no optimal joint management of local and global
externalities. Within the very recent LIMITS project, air quality model has been made endogenous in
WITCH model, which will allow later analysing the joint management of the two externalities.
Second, we use WITCH to determine the economic and technological impacts at global level, while
the non-GHG impacts and ancillary benefits are quantified for Europe and only from non-GHG
emission abatement in electricity sector. Our assessment is hence not complete.
Third, we are interested in finding out the distribution across European countries of the pollution
costs and of the ancillary benefits of climate change mitigation policy. The WITCH model provides
energy scenarios for two large blocs in Europe: Western and Eastern Europe. We therefore build
energy scenarios for 28 European countries assuming that each country’s share of total energy use in
the European bloc remains constant over time and under alternative climate mitigation policies. In
reality, fuel-mix may change differently across countries in the bloc. Assuming that each country will
mimic others within the bloc is quite a reasonable assumption, especially in the long run.
Fourth, ancillary benefits are determined by emission-fuel coefficients that are derived from the
EMEP EEA air pollutant emission inventory guidebook (EMEP/EEA 2013). More sources may provide a
wide range of the emission-fuel coefficients that might be used in a sensitivity analysis to estimate
uncertainty in our estimate of ancillary benefits. The emission factors of fuels also remain constant
over the entire period that actually implies no improvement in the efficacy of the end-of-pipe nonGHG abatement technologies. Incorporating dynamic improvement in the abatement efficacy would
significantly improve our calculations.
We leave all these possible extensions to future research.
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Appendix
Pollutant Unit

NMVOC

g/GJ

NOx
TSP

Hard Coal

Gaseous fuels

Value Lower Upper

Heavy Fuel Oil

Value

Lower

Upper

Value

2.6

0.65

10.4

Biomass

Lower Upper

Value

Lower Upper

2.3

1.4

3.2

7.31

2.44

21.9

1

0.6

2.4

g/GJ

209

200

350

89

15

185

142

70

300

81

40

160

g/GJ

11.4

3

300

0.89

0.445

1.34

35.4

2

200

172

86

344

PM10

g/GJ

7.7

2

20

0.89

0.445

1.34

25.2

1.5

150

155

77

310

PM2.5

g/GJ

3.4

0.9

90

0.89

0.445

1.34

19.3

0.9

90

133

66

266

SOx

g/GJ

820

330

5000

0.281

0.169

0.393

495

146

1700

10.8

6.45

15.1

Cd

mg/GJ

0.9

0.627

1.46

0.25*

0.08*

0.75*

1.2

0.6

2.4

1.76

1.06

2.47

As

mg/GJ

7.1

5.04

11.8

120*

40*

360*

3.98

1.99

7.97

9.46

5.68

13.2

Ni

mg/GJ

4.9

3.44

8.03

0.51*

0.17*

1.53*

255

127

510

14.2

8.51

19.9

Pb

mg/GJ

7.3

5.16

12

1.5*

0.5*

4.5*

4.56

2.28

9.11

20.6

12.4

28.9

Hg

mg/GJ

1.4

1.02

2.38

100*

10*

1000*

0.341

0.17

0.682

1.51

0.903

2.11

Cr

mg/GJ

4.5

3.2

7.46

0.76*

0.25*

2.28*

2.55

1.27

5.1

9.03

5.42

12.6

Note: Lower and Upper values indicate the range of 95% confidence interval for given emission factor. Term * denotes
factors expressed in g/GJ. Source: EMEP/EEA (2013).

Table A - 1. Emission factors for source category 1.A.1 - Public electricity and heat production.
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Authors

Country

Scenarios

AB in 2005€/tCO2

Pollutants

Impacts covered

Abt, 1999

USA

tax $30, $67 /tC*

2.3, 20

Criteria pollutants

Aunan, Aaheim, Seip, 2000

Hungary

Energy Conservation Program

148

Barker and Rosendahl, 2000

Tax $161/tC*

45

Boyd, Krutilla, Viscusi, 1995
Brendemoen and Vennemo, 1994

Western Europe
(19 regions)
USA
Norway

TSP, SO2, NOx, CO,
VOC, CO2, CH4, N2O,
VOC
SO2, NOx, PM10

$9/tC*
Tax $840/tC*

12
72

Burtraw et al., 1999
Burtraw et al., 2003

USA
USA

0.6 to 0.9
12.5 – 14.5

Burtraw, Linn, Palmer, Paul, 2014

USA

Cifuentes et al. 2000

Santiago, Chile

tax $10, $25, $50 per ton C*
$25 carbon tax in the energy
sector
cap-and-trade & tradable
performance standards that
reach 17% goal for 2020
Energy efficiency

Health – mortality and illness; Visibility and household soiling
(materials damage)
Health effects; damage on materials and vegetation. Annual
health benefits $648m, with a range of $370 to $1168m (Aaheim
et al. 1997).
Human and animal health and welfare, materials, buildings and
other physical capital, vegetation
Health, visibility
Indirect: Health costs; lost recreational value from lakes and
forests; corrosion
Direct: Traffic noise, road maintenance, congestion, accidents
Health
Health effects

Dessus and O’Connor, 1999

Chile

73, 74, 78

Garbaccio, Ho, Jorgenson, 2000
Grossman, Muller, O’Neill-Toy, 2011

China
USA

Holland et al., 2011

EU27

Tax $67, $157, $284 (10%, 20%,
30% C reduction)*
Tax $1/tC, $2/tC*
Warner-Lieberman bill (S.2191)
of 2007
2˚C stabilization scenario

Kiuila, Markandya, Ščasný,
Tsuchimoto, forthcoming
Nemet, Holloway, Meier, 2010

Czech Republic

Full internalization of local
external costs
NA

32 – 72

Parry, Veung, Heine, 2014

Nationally efficient carbon prices

Rečka and Ščasný, 2013

20 top world-wide
emitters
Czech Republic

EU ETS till 2030

38 (1.6 – 152)
33 (developed)
44 (from -17 to 220)
65 (for coal)
15

Scheraga and Leary, 1993

USA

$144/tC*

12

Ščasný and Rečka, forthcoming

Slovakia

11

West et al. 2013

14 world regions

17€/tCO2, -20% & -25% CO2
target
NA

review

34 – 44

18

15
1 – 63
24

43 – 326

Pb, PM, SOx, SO4, O3
SO2, NOx, CO, VOC,
CO2, CH4, N2O,
Particulates
SO2, NOx
NOx, PM10, TSP, SO2,
sulfates
SO2

Health effects based on damage factors in EPA (2011)

SO2, NOx, CO, NMHC,
PM10, dust
7 air pollutants

Health

PM10, SO2
PM2.5, VOC, NOx,
SO2,NH3 and O3
PM2.5, PMcoarse, SO2,
NOx
PM2.5, PMcoarse, SO2,
NOx
NA

Health
Health effects using APEEP model

PM2.5, SO2, NOx

Health (intake fractions extrapolated from the average plant in
China)
Health effects, effects on crops, building materials and
ecosystems (ExternE).
Health – morbidity and mortality

PM2.5, PMcoarse, SO2,
NOx
TSP, PM10, SOx, NOx,
CO, VOC, CO2, Pb
PM2.5, PMcoarse, SO2,
NOx

Health (morbidity, mortality, IQ effect)

Health effects, effects on crops, building materials and
ecosystems (ExternE).
Health effects, effects on crops, building materials and
ecosystems (ExternE).
Health effects, various impact categories

Health effects, effects on crops, building materials and
ecosystems (ExternE).
Health impacts, air quality model used

Note: * This information is based on OECD (2002) and tax is expressed in 1996 US$. The ancillary benefits are recalculated in 2005 Euro by CPI and purchasing power standard rate.

Table A - 2. Review of ancillary benefits per ton of CO2, in €2005.
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